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Oligopsony Power in the Ukrainian Milk Processing Industry: Evidence from the 
Regional Markets for Raw Milk 
 
Abstract 
Most of the studies based on the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach 
use industry data to estimate the degree of market power at the national level. Yet, only a 
few empirical studies presented results that measure the degree of market power at the 
regional level. Some of these studies found evidence for the existence of market power in 
regional markets. Although there is extensive evidence suggesting the existence of 
oligopsony market power in the Ukrainian milk processing industry (price cartels and 
geographic market sharing among milk processing enterprises, interference of the state 
authorities, relatively high concentration on regional markets), estimation results of a 
market structure model at the national level does not produce any evidence suggesting the 
exercise of oligopsony power on the Ukrainian market for raw milk (the estimated 
parameter of oligopsony power is close to zero and statistically insignificant). On the other 
hand, estimation of the market structure model at the regional level suggests the existence 
of oligopsony power in four out of twenty two regions of Ukraine with a potential 
deviation of procurement prices for raw milk from the value marginal product of raw milk 
in the range from 3.6 to 46.7 %. 
Keywords: New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO), Oligopsony Power, Ukraine. 
1  Introduction 
March 2, 2002, when legislation on the “Protection of Economic Competition” was passed, 
can be considered as the commencement of legal functionality of the Antimonopoly 
Committee of Ukraine. Previously, the Antimonopoly Committee did not quite have an 
opportunity to protect economic competition between enterprises (cf. Seredyuk, 2003).   3
Particular attention is paid by the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine to the market of 
raw milk. For the period of 2000 through 2006 there were many antitrust law violations 
discovered in 18 out of the 25 oblasts of Ukraine by territorial offices of the Antimonopoly 
Committee (cf. Annual reports of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine). Only in 2002, 
there were six antitrust law violations stopped on the regional market of raw milk, 
involving individual milk factories in Zhytomyr oblast (province) that were setting low 
procurement prices for raw milk (cf. Seredyuk, 2003). Formerly, in a planned economy, 
procurement of raw milk was more or less limited to the boundaries of the administrative 
district, where the milk processing plant was located. Today, under the conditions of a 
developing market economy, these regions became “borderless”, i.e., procurement of raw 
milk is conducted even outside of the district of milk plant’s home location. It would seem 
that this situation is ideal for the development of competition between dairy enterprises on 
the raw milk market. Nevertheless, according to research results and the information 
obtained from representatives of the dairy enterprises by the territorial offices of the 
Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine in Vinnytsia oblast, it was found that the heads of 
the dairy enterprises periodically meet, conduct gatherings during which they discuss the 
issues of raw milk procurement, corroborate the procurement prices for raw milk and also 
converse regarding the questions of geographical market sharing between the dairy 
enterprises in the region (cf. Dovgalyuk and Konovalyuk, 2003).  
Furthermore, the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine has stopped a violation of antitrust 
laws in the form of a ban and restrictions on inter-regional trade in the raw milk market 
ordered by the Oblast State Administration in the oblasts of Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Ivano-
Frankivsk and Khmelnytskyi (cf. Annual reports of Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, 
2000).    4
Before the liberalization of prices in 1992, milk processing in Ukraine was concentrated in 
regionally almost equally distributed large state milk processing factories. In the meantime, 
the state milk processing factories have been privatized. However, the emerging 
privatization forms were heterogeneous. That is why different kinds of market conduct 
and, consequently, market performance, can be expected, depending on the ownership and 
incentive structures involved. Until today, the distribution of the milk processing plants 
reflects the principles of a planned economy in that there is still one processing plant in 
almost every administrative region of Ukraine.  
In Ukraine, in comparison with other countries, such as Germany, there is a large number 
of dairy plants. In 2003, in Germany there were about 261 dairy plants, while in Ukraine 
there were two and a half times as much, amounting to 649 dairy plants. Measuring by 
value of shipments, Perekhozhuk (2007: 72) has calculated the concentration rate for the 
Ukrainian milk processing industry at the national level. In the period from 2001 to 2004, 
the revenue share of the six largest milk processing plants (CR6) increased from 12 % to 15 
%. While the 100 largest milk processing plants (CR100) control about 70 % of sales of 
milk and milk products, the other 30 % are counted among more than 500 small milk 
processing plants. Still, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is on average 7.9, which is 
relatively small when compared with other countries. For example, in 2002 the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index for the German milk processing industry was 28.7. The U.S. dairy 
industry was even more concentrated with an index of 147.0 in 1997 (cf. US Census 
Bureau, 2001). 
It should be noted that while calculating the concentration measures, there emerge specific 
methodological problems related to the identification of geographical and commodity 
boundaries of the market. Typically, the concentration is calculated based on the total 
revenue from a specific kind of merchandise or merchandise group in a domestic market.   5
However, processing enterprises may not only serve the domestic (national) market, but 
also foreign markets. About 50 % of the Ukrainian milk and dairy products go to the world 
market, albeit, first and foremost, it exports to the Russian Federation. In this case, we can 
get a significantly inflated measure of concentration of milk processing industry in 
Ukraine. On the other hand, when analyzing the market of raw milk, it is inappropriate to 
use the same milk processing industry concentration measure. Considering the commodity 
characteristics of raw milk and that the milk processing enterprises in Ukraine conduct a 
procurement of milk usually within a radius of no more than 150 km, the market of raw 
milk is, above all, a regional market. Therefore, while analyzing the structure of the raw 
milk market, it seems reasonable to use the share of a milk processing enterprise on the 
raw milk market in the geographical boundaries of an oblast or a region. Perekhozhuk 
(2007: 73-77) shows that the concentration of the Ukrainian milk processing industry at the 
regional level is vastly different. In 2 out of the 25 regions, the largest milk processing 
plants held shares of 77 % and 83 % in the regional market, respectively. Under such 
conditions milk processing enterprises were able to gain a regional monopsony or 
oligopsony position on the raw milk market. Although one might assume that the low 
operating rate (which was as low as 10 % at the end of the 1990s) triggered sharp 
competition between the milk processing plants for raw milk, the concentration of the milk 
processing enterprises in some regions suggests, on the other hand, a strong market 
position for the milk processors with the exertion of market power vis-à-vis the raw milk 
producers. Therefore, initially, it is not clear what competitive situation the country’s 
dairies found themselves in, vis-à-vis the raw milk suppliers – i.e. the agricultural 
enterprises and small family farms in 1990s, which still may exist today. Moreover, given 
that the concentration of the Ukrainian milk processing industry differs radically at the   6
regional level, we expect that the estimated degree of oligopsony power in some regions is 
significantly larger than in others.  
Consequently, the objective of this study is to determine the degree of oligopsony power in 
the regional market for raw milk using a market structure model, which was estimated by a 
nonlinear estimation method. The model is based on the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) approach. Most of the empirical studies based upon this approach 
aim at estimating the degree of market power within the national boundaries of the market 
using industry level data
1. As far as we know, only Wann and Sexton (1992), Weliwita and 
Azzam (1996), as well as Koontz and Garcia (1997), have estimated the degree of market 
power on a regional market level and found evidence of market power in the pear and meat 
packing industries, respectively. Thus, using regional data for the Ukrainian milk 
processing industry, it may be more probable to find oligopsony power of milk processing 
enterprises in the regional market for the raw milk than at the national level. 
Our paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the theoretical model of 
oligopsony power followed by its econometric specification in Section 3. Section 4 
describes the sources of the statistical data. The estimation results and specification tests 
are discussed in Section 5. The final section consists of the results and conclusions. 
2  Structural model of oligopsony market power 
The Ukrainian agricultural milk farms, as well as the households in agricultural areas, 
produce raw milk (M) and deliver it generally to the local milk processing plants. We 
assume that the supply of raw milk delivered to the milk processing plants can be 
represented by the following inverse supply function  
                                                 
1 For an overview of structural model estimates for the agricultural and food markets based on the New 
Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach, see Bresnahan (1989), Azzam (1998), Sexton and 
Lavoie (2001), Wohlgenant (2001) and Perekhozhuk (2007: 92-95).   7
) , ( S M g WM = ,  (1)
where  M W  is the price of raw milk and S is a vector of the supply shifters.  
We assume that the milk processing industry produces a homogeneous product Y  using 
one agricultural input (raw milk M ) and several non-agricultural inputs (N ). The 
production function of the milk processing industry is  
( ) N , M f Y =   (2)
Given this representation of the inverse raw milk supply function (1) and the production 
function (2), the profit equation for the milk processing industry can be written as:  
N W N N ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ = Π     ) , ( M W M f P M ,  (3)
where  P  is the output price of the milk processing industry and  N W  is a vector of prices 
of non-agricultural inputs.  
We assume that the milk processing plants maximize their profit and set the price for the 
raw milk. The first-order condition for profit maximization that allows for imperfect 
competition (oligopsony power) in the raw milk market is: 
where  Θ  is the parameter indexing the degree of oligopsony power,  M f  is the marginal 
product of raw milk and  () ( ) M W W M M M ∂ ∂ = ε  is the market price elasticity of the 
supply of the raw milk. If  0 = Θ , then the market for raw milk is perfectly competitive and 
the aggregate value marginal product of the raw milk equals the market price of the raw 
milk. If  1 = Θ , then the market for the raw milk is monopsonistic or the dairies act like a 
monopsony (cartel) and the marginal factor cost is equated to the value of the marginal 
product for profit maximization. Intermediate values of Θ  imply the presence of an 
oligopsonistic market structure, where the interpretation of the first-order condition is that 








1,   (4)  8
the “perceived” marginal factor cost equals the aggregate value marginal product of raw 
milk.  
3  Econometric specification of the market structure model 
With regard to the empirical application of the market structure model, we assume that the 
raw milk supply function (1) can be written as a truncated second-order approximation to a 
general transcendental logarithmic function
2: 




i i ϕ δ δ φ β β + + + + + = ∑ ∑   (5)
where  () F B D M i Wi , , , =  is, respectively, the price at which the milk is supplied to the 
dairies () M W , the direct marketing price for milk
3 that is sold directly to consumers ( ) D W , 
the price received for beef cattle () B W  and the price of mixed feeds ( ) F W . C  is the number 
of milking cows as quasi-fixed factor and T  is a linear time trend to account for an 
autonomous change (technical change and other unaccounted for factors affecting short-
run supply response over time;  96 ,..., 1 = T ).  
Solving equation (5) for  M W  and differentiating with respect to M , we obtain the 
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2 Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) give proof of the conditions and properties of the functional forms for 
identification of market power. According to the authors, this function, in the context of this paper, must have 
the following specific properties: it (a) must be at least of a second degree in M , (b) must be non-separable 
in M and (c) must have no constant elasticity with respect to M . The truncated transcendental logarithmic 
function (5) fits all the properties at the same time. 
3 During the transition period in Ukraine the market share of milk sold directly to consumers rapidly 
increased from 0.1 % in 1990 to 21.2 % in 2000. This had a significant impact on the supply of raw milk 
delivered to the milk processing industry (cf. Perekhozhuk, 2007: 33-36).   9
where  WM MT M T ε δ β = +  is the own price elasticity of raw milk supply.  
Considering the cost structure of the Ukrainian milk processing industry we focused on the 
most important factors of production in terms of cost components and assumed that the 
milk processing industry uses only four factors, namely, raw milk  () M , labor  ( ) L , 
capital () K  and energy () E . The marginal product of raw milk M  is defined as the partial 
derivative of the translog production function
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where  E K L M X j , , , = . T  is a linear time trend to account for the technical change in the 
milk processing industry over time ( ) 96 ,..., 1 = T . Using equations (6) and (7), equation (4) 
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The econometric model consists of equations (5) and (8), where, to allow for the existence 
of random shocks, an additive disturbance term is added, which is assumed to have a zero 
mean, constant variance, and be independently and normally distributed. In addition, to 
account for the seasonality in our monthly time series data, eleven monthly dummy 
variables (cf.  i β  and  i α ,  12 ,..., 2 = i , in Table A1) were added to equations (5) and (8), 
respectively. 
4  Description of statistical data source 
In order to test for the existence of oligopsony power on the regional markets for raw milk 
we use regional data sets that include 96 monthly observations from January, 1996, to 
December, 2003. The choice of the sample period was influenced by data availability. All 
                                                 
4 Cf. Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973).   10
the statistical data were collected from the following statistical bulletins and periodicals of 
the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine: “The sale of milk and dairy products to 
procurement organizations of the milk processing industry by all types of agricultural 
farms”, “The sale of agricultural products to procurement organizations by agricultural 
enterprises”, “The statistical summary data about state stock-breeding by all types of 
agricultural farms”, “Industrial products of Ukraine”, “Producer price indices”, the reports 
of the Division of Labor Statistics, the Statistical Yearbooks “Labor of Ukraine” and 
various issues of the Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine. For a more detailed definition of 
model variables and description of the sources of the statistical data, see Perekhozhuk 
(2007: 105-122). 
5  Estimation results and specification testing  
In the market structure model consisting of equations (5) and (8), the price of raw milk 
() M W  and the quantity of raw milk ( ) M  are endogenous. Since equation (8) is intrinsically 
nonlinear in its parameters, the market structure model represents a nonlinear simultaneous 
equation system. Therefore, the model was estimated using nonlinear three-stage least 
squares (cf.  Amemiya, 1977). All the exogenous variables in the system were used as 
instruments. Estimation was carried out using the statistical software SAS (SAS, 2008: 
925-1239). 
We estimated 26 market structure models, one of them at the national level and 25 at the 
regional level. For a general comparison of the statistical properties of the estimated 
models, Table 1 lists the R-squares, Durbin-Watson statistics and objective values of 
models estimated at the national level for Ukraine, along with the models for Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea and twenty one administrative oblasts (regions). The results for three 
regions were not presented because estimation of parameters of these models did not   11
converge. In addition, we give the minimal, maximal and the mean values of the 
R-squares, the Durbin-Watson coefficient and the objective value of the model
5. 
Table 1 Basic coefficients of statistical inference of NL3SLS estimation of market 
structure models 
The fit of the estimated market structure models for each region in Ukraine is quite good. 
The R-squares, as well as the adjusted R-squares ( )
2 R , between observed and predicted 
values obtained for the equations of the raw milk supply function in each sample unit are 
very similar, with an arithmetic mean of about 0.90. For the equation of the first-order 
condition the variation of R-squares is larger than for the supply equation. For the 
                                                 
5 The estimated parameters and the coefficients for statistical inference of the market structure models are 
reported in Table A 1 for Ukraine at the national level, for Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the 21 
administrative oblasts (regions). 
2 R   2 R   DW  Sample unit  
(region)  M ln   M W   M ln   M W   M ln   M W  
Obj. 
Value 
 Ukraine  0.9788 0.9232 0.9728 0.9052 1.3279 2.0849 0.6299
01  Crimea  0.8497 0.6699 0.8093 0.5934 1.4938 1.6357 0.6274
02  Vinnytsia  0.9588 0.8561 0.9471 0.8225 1.2231 1.7632 0.3848
03  Volyn  0.9215 0.6011 0.9017 0.5087 1.2065 2.0767 0.5509
04  Dnipropetrovsk  0.8811 0.8056 0.8514 0.7602 1.3608 2.0574 0.3365
05  Donetsk    0.9186 0.7384 0.8980 0.6778 1.3886 1.8674 0.4010
06  Zhytomyr  0.9349 0.8853 0.9174 0.8588 1.6259 2.0669 0.6380
07  Zakarpattia  0.9000 0.2572 0.8716 0.0836 1.6559 2.0752 0.2725
08  Zaporizhia  0.8444 0.6744 0.8025 0.5990 1.0871 2.0863 0.3490
09  Ivano-Frankivsk 0.9406 0.9402 0.9237 0.9262 1.7656 1.4330 0.5460
10  Kiev    0.9348 0.9481 0.9163 0.9360 1.7930 1.6770 0.5295
11  Kirovohrad  0.9370 0.6085 0.9212 0.5170 1.0785 1.1030 0.5149
12  Luhansk  0.9054 0.7986 0.8817 0.7515 0.7537 1.8424 0.5125
13  Lviv  0.9227 0.8929 0.9019 0.8681 0.9177 1.4900 0.7242
14  Mykolaiv  0.9624 0.9212 0.9518 0.9028 1.2803 1.6106 0.6455
16  Poltava    0.9410 0.9276 0.9243 0.9107 1.7915 1.8725 0.5649
18  Sumy    0.9414 0.9158 0.9267 0.8962 1.5809 1.2823 0.5189
19  Ternopil  0.8830 0.8936 0.8535 0.8690 1.1492 1.7794 0.4573
21  Kherson    0.9074 0.6263 0.8843 0.5389 1.1489 1.7586 0.4301
22  Khmelnytskyi  0.9197 0.8980 0.9007 0.8744 0.9778 1.2228 0.6807
23  Cherkasy  0.8490 0.7935 0.8133 0.7457 0.8490 2.1681 0.5460
24  Chernivtsi  0.9257 0.7886 0.9057 0.7397 1.2958 1.4429 0.2751
25  Chernihiv  0.9619 0.3181 0.9510 0.1586 1.6246 1.9944 0.3692
Minimum  0.8444 0.2572 0.8025 0.0836 0.7537 1.1030 0.2725
Maximum  0.9788 0.9481 0.9728 0.9360 1.7930 2.1681 0.7242
Mean  0.9183 0.7688 0.8969 0.7150 1.3207 1.7561 0.5002
Note: Numbering of the regions correspond to the official numbers of administrative
regions, applied by the State statistics committee of Ukraine.   12
Zakarpattia and the Chernihiv regions the R-squares are particularly low. Otherwise, the R-
squares range from 0.60 (0.50) to 0.95 (0.94). 
The Durbin-Watson coefficient, obtained for each region, lies in the inconclusive range. In 
spite of a relatively large number of time-series observations, the range between the lower 
and upper critical values is rather large. With the exception of four regions (Luhansk, Lviv, 
Khmelnytskyi and Cherkasy), the Durbin-Watson coefficient is greater than 1.07 and 1.10 
for the first and second equations of the market structure model. The mean of the obtained 
value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.32 for the supply function and 1.75 for the 
equation of the first order condition. It is a common practice to use the minimized values 
of the objective function (residual sum of squares of the model, which is to be minimized) 
in the NL3SLS estimation as an additional criterion for a comparison of the estimated 
models. The comparisons of the results of NL3SLS estimation reveal a good performance 
of the market structure model. The difference between the calculated minimal and maximal 
values of the objective function is a negligible margin and lies between 0.27 (Zakarpattia 
oblast) and 0.72 (Lviv oblast), respectively.  
Table 2 shows the parameters of the market structure models as estimated by NL3SLS, 
which can easily be interpreted because all variables were measured as deviations from 
their geometric mean. Therefore, the parameters  ( ) F B D M j j , , , = β  of the estimated 
supply function represent the price elasticities of the raw milk supply,  C φ  is the supply 
elasticity of quasi-fixed inputs represented by the number of milking cows, the parameter 
T δ  is the rate of an autonomous change in the farm milk supply and the parameter  M α  is 
the production elasticity of raw milk, which appears in the first-order condition for profit 
maximization. The results of the model estimation indicate that the estimated own price 
elasticity of the raw milk supply ( ) M β  is more elastic at the national level, compared with 
the own price elasticity for each region separately.   13
Table 2 Selected parameters of N3SLS estimation of the market structure models 
In many regions, such as the Crimea, Lviv and Chernivtsi, the raw milk supply is inelastic 
and is not larger than 0.01. The own price elasticity of the raw milk supply in 
Dnipropetrovsk, Kiev and Sumy is larger than 0.50. There is a large difference between the 
minimum and maximum values for the price elasticity of the raw milk supply among the 
regions. On average, it is 0.25. In 15 out of the 23 estimated models, the own price 
elasticity is statistically significant at the 5 % level.  
Only for four out of the twenty two regions, the parameter of the variable for the price of 
milk sold directly to consumers has the expected sign and is statistically significant at the 
10 % level. The originally estimated raw milk supply function for ten out of twenty two 
regions unexpectedly showed a positive sign for this variable. Therefore, the variable for 
the price of the consumer milk was omitted from the supply function for these regions and 
the corresponding market structure models have been reestimated. The Wald test of the 
Sample unit 
(region)  M β   D β   B β   F β   C φ   T δ   M α   Θ  
 Ukraine  0.90  -0.39 0.43 -0.65 -2.84 -0.0164  1.44  0.0018
01 Crimea  0.01  -0.22 0.97 -0.76 -3.38 -0.0181  1.36  0.0046
02 Vinnytsia  0.07  0.20 0.71 -0.73 -3.01 -0.0097  1.71 -0.0009
03 Volyn  0.16  -  0.39 -0.55 -8.43 -0.0284  1.36  0.0060
04 Dnipropetrovsk  0.78  -  0.54 -0.74 -1.45 -0.0252  1.27  0.0293
05 Donetsk    0.44  -  0.36 -0.80 1.16 0.0051  1.17  0.0227
06 Zhytomyr  0.41  -0.06 0.40 -0.75 -3.21 -0.0107  1.28  0.0013
07 Zakarpattia  0.09  -0.05 0.77 -0.34 -5.24 -0.0136  1.23 -0.0001
08 Zaporizhia  0.05  -0.11 0.95 -0.90 0.75 0.0112  1.40  0.0097
09 Ivano-Frankivsk  0.18  0.07 1.07 -0.24 -4.31 -0.0273  0.94  0.0005
10 Kiev    0.62  -0.04 0.24 -0.90 0.19 0.0028  1.24 -0.0063
11 Kirovohrad  0.18  -  0.53 -1.00 -4.11 -0.0311  1.32  0.0242
12 Luhansk  0.03  -  0.97 -1.82 -5.45 -0.0166  1.29  0.0090
13 Lviv  0.01  -0.24 0.52 -0.29 2.06 0.0030  1.02 -0.0003
14 Mykolaiv  0.08  -0.52 0.69 -0.61 -2.65 0.0007  1.23  0.0000
16 Poltava    0.19  -0.23 0.87 -0.66 -4.07 -0.0208  1.22 -0.0007
18 Sumy    0.50  -  0.47 -0.48 -3.21 -0.0228  1.29 -0.0043
19 Ternopil  0.03  -  0.35 -0.37 -6.56 -0.0327  1.39  0.0050
21 Kherson    0.43  -  0.94 -0.45 1.20 -0.0027  1.41 -0.0071
22 Khmelnytskyi  0.07  -  0.81 -0.88 -5.13 -0.0207  1.36  0.0007
23 Cherkasy  0.44  -  0.55 -0.99 1.70 0.0111  1.24  0.0033
24 Chernivtsi  0.01  -0.15 0.77 -0.63 -2.13 -0.0146  1.46  0.0078
25 Chernihiv  0.04  -0.19 0.92 -1.33 -7.36 -0.0352  1.58  0.0102
Minimum 0.01  -0.52 0.24 -1.82 -8.43 -0.0352  0.94  -0.0071
Maximum 0.90  0.20 1.07 -0.24 2.06 0.0112  1.71  0.0293
Mean 0.25  -0.15 0.66 -0.73 -2.85 -0.0136  1.31  0.0051  14
hypothesis that the own and cross-price elasticities of raw milk supply evaluated at the 
sample mean add up to zero, in about half of the sample units, is not rejected. In ten out of 
the twenty two regions, homogeneity of degree zero of the supply function in prices 
originally was rejected at the 5 % significance level or less. In order to guarantee the 
important theoretical property of homogeneity of raw milk supply, these sample units were 
reestimated with the restriction for zero degree homogeneity in prices. The own-price and 
cross-price elasticities of raw milk supply were evaluated at the sample mean. The price 
elasticities are less than one, have the expected signs and are compatible with economic 
theory. The raw milk delivered to the milk processing industry is a substitute for the milk 
that was sold directly to consumers, while there is a complementarity relationship with 
beef cattle. The cross-price elasticity for the beef cattle for all sample units is highly 
statistically significant at least at the 5 % level of significance or less. The price elasticity 
of mixed feeds () F β  is negative and statistically significant in eighteen out of the twenty 
three sample units at least at the 5 % level.  
From a theoretical point of view, the supply elasticity of quasi-fixed inputs () C φ  does not 
in general conform with expectations, because it is positive only in five out of the twenty 
three sample units. This result may in part be attributed to the fact that the share of raw 
milk delivered to dairies in total production of raw milk is rather small for milk producing 
households (about 30 %) and that even for agricultural firms it is not larger than 60 %. 
Therefore, this variable does not seem to have a considerable impact on the raw milk 
supply delivered to the milk processing industry.  
The estimation results for the rate of autonomous change in the raw milk supply () T δ  are 
remarkable in that in most sample units we find a negative rate of autonomous change. 
Only in five out of the twenty three samples, the rate of the autonomous change was 
positive, yet statistically insignificant. This outcome may be attributed to the turmoil of the   15
transition process in the 1990s. In accordance with Bresnahan (1982), the linear time trend 
variable T  that we applied, enters interactively with the supply-side exogenous variables, 
so that the supply curve rotates every successive time period. The parameter  M β  and  MT δ  
are highly significant at any reasonable level of significance in all the samples and are 
shared by two of the simultaneous equations (supply function and FOC) to be estimated.  
The estimation results of the models show that the estimated production elasticity of raw 
milk () M α  is highly statistically significant but, at first sight, unexpectedly large in all the 
sample units. This result may be due, in part, to the fact that only some of the parameters 
of the complete translog production function have been estimated. This suggests that in this 
particular case, the translog production function (2) should be added as an additional 
equation to the market structure model. On the other hand, in another study (Perekhozhuk 
et al., 2008) we estimated the production function at the national level and found some 
evidence, first, for increasing returns to scale and, second, for a negative production 
elasticity of labour input. These findings can be attributed to the low level of capacity 
utilisation in the 1990s in the milk processing industry of Ukraine and to state regulation 
preventing reduction of labour input to an extent, which was considered necessary from an 
economic point of view. In view of these findings the large production elasticities of raw 
milk input may be considered less surprising even at the regional level. 
The estimation of the degree of oligopsony power in the regional markets for raw milk is 
the main issue of this study. The parameter of oligopsony power at the national level Θ  is 
close to zero and statistically insignificant. However, the estimates of the parameter Θ  
indicate oligopsony power in four out of the twenty three regions. In two regions, 
Chernivtsi (24) and Chernihiv (25), the estimates of the parameter Θ  are statistically 
significant at the 10  % level. If one is prepared to accept levels of significance for 
parameter  Θ of up to 15 %, the regions of Dnipropetrovsk (11.2 %) and Kirovohrad   16
(13.6 %) can be added to the list of regions where oligopsony market power may have 
been exerted. This conforms with the statements of the Antimonopoly Committee of 
Ukraine in its annual reports about investigated cases of violations of the antitrust laws in, 
among others, the regions of Chernivtsi, Chernihiv and Kirovohrad. Moreover, the regional 
concentration of the milk processing industry as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index is particularly high in two of these regions.. The index amounts to 104.7 in 
Dnipropetrovsk and to 626.9 in Kirovohrad (cf. Perekhozhuk, 2007: 74).  
On the basis of equation (8) and the estimation results for parameters Θ  and  M β , for these 
four regions the potential percentage deviation of procurement prices from value marginal 
products of raw milk can be calculated. It amounts to –3.6 % for the region of 
Dnipropetrovsk, -11.7 % for Kirovohrad, -46.7 % for Chernivtsi, and –22.5 % for 
Chernihiv. 
6  Summary and conclusions  
The objective of this study was to estimate the degree of oligopsony power in the 
Ukrainian milk processing industry. In spite of the fact that there is an extensive evidence 
for the existence of a potential oligopsony market power in the Ukrainian milk processing 
industry (price cartels and geographic market sharing among milk processing enterprises, 
interference of the state authorities, high concentration on regional markets), the estimation 
results of the market structure model at the national level did not produce any evidence 
suggesting the exercise of oligopsony power. The estimated parameter indicating 
oligopsony power is close to zero and statistically insignificant. However, the estimation 
results at the regional level indicate the existence of oligopsony power in at least two and 
possibly in up to four out of the twenty three regions of Ukraine, for which market 
structure models have been estimated. The hypothesis of perfect competition can be 
rejected, in two cases with a 10 % and in another two cases with a level of statistical   17
significance of less than 15 %. For these regions the results suggest that procurement 
prices for raw milk potentially may be 3.6 to 46.7 % lower than the value marginal product 
of raw milk. Moreover, the econometric analysis of the structural model and the 
measurement of oligopsony power at the regional level confirm the results of the 
investigations conducted by the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine for the regions of 
Kirovohrad (11), Chernivtsi (24) and Chernihiv (25). In addition, the results of this study 
suggest the existence of oligopsony power also in the region of Dnipropetrovsk (4). As far 
as the authors are aware, the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine has not investigated 
violations of antitrust law by the milk processing enterprises in this region. 
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Table A 1. Estimated parameters and statistical inference of N3SLS estimation of market structure models 
Ukraine  Region 01 Crimea  Region 02 Vinnytsia  Region 03 Volyn  Region 04 Dnipropetrovsk  Region 05 Donetsk 
Parameter 
Estimate  St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate  St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate  St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate  St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t| 
0 β   -0.9797 0.0502 -19.50 <.0001 -0.8706 0.1264 -6.89 <.0001 -0.7008 0.0708 -9.90 <.0001 -1.2020 0.1059 -11.35 <.0001 -1.1347 0.1069 -10.61 <.0001 -0.7323 0.0831 -8.81  <.0001 
M β   0.8984 0.1647 5.45 <.0001  0.0143 0.0091 1.58 0.1194 0.0727 0.0374 1.94 0.0559 0.1569 0.0655 2.40 0.0191 0.7800 0.1194 6.53 <.0001 0.4444 0.0968  4.59 <.0001 
D β   -0.3904 0.1722 -2.27 0.0264 -0.2196 0.1513 -1.45 0.1508 0.1967 0.1081 1.82 0.0730 - -  -  - - -  -  - - -  -  - 
B β   0.4314 0.0543 7.94 <.0001  0.9654 0.1990 4.85 <.0001 0.7110 0.0680 10.46 <.0001 0.3940 0.1365 2.89 0.0051 0.5370 0.1234 4.35 <.0001 0.3586 0.1149 3.12  0.0025 
F β   -0.6498 0.1724 -3.77 0.0003 -0.7600 0.2234 -3.40 0.0011 -0.7302 0.2304 -3.17 0.0022 -0.5509 0.1431 -3.85 0.0002 -0.7375 0.3973 -1.86 0.0673 -0.8030 0.1702 -4.72  <.0001 
C φ   -2.8360 1.2123 -2.34 0.0220 -3.3840 1.7256 -1.96 0.0536 -3.0058 1.5195 -1.98 0.0516 -8.4325 1.5980 -5.28 <.0001 -1.4501 0.9036 -1.6 0.1127 1.1595 0.4187 2.77  0.0071 
T δ   -0.0164 0.0043 -3.79 0.0003 -0.0181 0.0094 -1.92 0.0593 -0.0097 0.0033 -2.96 0.0041 -0.0284 0.0069 -4.15 <.0001 -0.0252 0.0062 -4.06 0.0001 0.0051 0.0035 1.48  0.1421 
MT δ   0.0193 0.0035 5.45 <.0001  0.0181 0.0063 2.86 0.0054 0.0058 0.0030 1.94 0.0558 0.0111 0.0046 2.40 0.0186 0.0309 0.0047 6.6 <.0001 0.0258 0.0054 4.74 <.0001 
DT δ   0.0093 0.0038 2.47 0.0159  0.0084 0.0060 1.40 0.1662 -0.0054 0.0035 -1.55 0.1264 0.0052 0.0052 1.01 0.3157 - -  -  -  0.0112 0.0048  2.35  0.0211 
BT δ   0.0122 0.0024 5.12 <.0001 -0.0115 0.0073 -1.57 0.1201 0.0037 0.0050 0.74 0.4626 0.0243 0.0047 5.20 <.0001 0.0083 0.0052 1.62 0.1103 0.0155 0.0075 2.08  0.0409 
FT δ   0.0026 0.0056 0.46 0.6433  0.0258 0.0122 2.11 0.0379 -0.0121 0.0057 -2.14 0.0359 0.0052 0.0108 0.48 0.6331 -0.0030 0.0127 -0.23 0.8156 0.0267 0.0077 3.45  0.0009 
CT ϕ   0.0481 0.0188 2.56 0.0125  0.0176 0.0329 0.54 0.5939 -0.1297 0.0316 -4.10 0.0001 0.0426 0.0536 0.79 0.4295 0.0192 0.0228 0.84 0.4013 0.0877 0.0261 3.37  0.0012 
2 β   -0.0656 0.0538 -1.22 0.2269 -0.2247 0.1240 -1.81 0.0739 -0.1281 0.0634 -2.02 0.0470 -0.3023 0.1169 -2.59 0.0116 -0.0358 0.1055 -0.34 0.7354 -0.2676 0.0989 -2.71  0.0084 
3 β   -0.0478 0.0509 -0.94 0.3511  0.0644 0.1236 0.52 0.6036 -0.1591 0.0634 -2.51 0.0143 -0.1576 0.1170 -1.35 0.1818 -0.0294 0.1053 -0.28 0.7811 -0.2425 0.0995 -2.44  0.0172 
4 β   0.3495 0.0493 7.09 <.0001  0.2856 0.1389 2.06 0.0432 0.0977 0.0637 1.53 0.1294 0.4142 0.1186 3.49 0.0008 0.5658 0.1109 5.1 <.0001 0.0490 0.0981 0.50 0.6191 
5 β   0.5813 0.0500 11.64 <.0001  0.5819 0.1431 4.07 0.0001 0.1849 0.0643 2.88 0.0053 0.7110 0.1210 5.88 <.0001 0.7320 0.1183 6.19 <.0001 0.1908 0.0983 1.94  0.0559 
6 β   1.1944 0.0544 21.96 <.0001  1.0339 0.1577 6.56 <.0001 0.7224 0.0661 10.93 <.0001 1.5025 0.1257 11.95 <.0001 1.3602 0.1372 9.91 <.0001 0.7272 0.1002 7.26  <.0001 
7 β   1.4399 0.0571 25.22 <.0001  1.2340 0.1699 7.26 <.0001 0.9402 0.0703 13.36 <.0001 1.7799 0.1262 14.10 <.0001 1.6436 0.1476 11.13 <.0001 1.0726 0.1027 10.45  <.0001 
8 β   1.3484 0.0581 23.19 <.0001  1.1699 0.1613 7.25 <.0001 0.9808 0.0718 13.65 <.0001 1.6159 0.1266 12.76 <.0001 1.5940 0.1523 10.47 <.0001 0.9721 0.1044 9.31  <.0001 
9 β   1.2194 0.0562 21.69 <.0001  1.0674 0.1545 6.91 <.0001 0.8642 0.0703 12.30 <.0001 1.5009 0.1238 12.12 <.0001 1.3585 0.1399 9.71 <.0001 0.7972 0.1012 7.87  <.0001 
10 β   0.9682 0.0518 18.68 <.0001  0.8198 0.1448 5.66 <.0001 0.6927 0.0662 10.46 <.0001 1.3421 0.1217 11.03 <.0001 1.0933 0.1230 8.89 <.0001 0.6475 0.1021 6.34  <.0001 
11 β   0.7093 0.0484 14.66 <.0001  0.6266 0.1405 4.46 <.0001 0.4328 0.0624 6.93 <.0001 0.8712 0.1233 7.07 <.0001 0.7384 0.1140 6.48 <.0001 0.4516 0.1011 4.47  <.0001 
12 β   0.2368 0.0449 5.27 <.0001  0.3497 0.1228 2.85 0.0057 0.1086 0.0575 1.89 0.0629 0.0956 0.1170 0.82 0.4165 0.2750 0.1069 2.57 0.0120 -0.0709 0.0987 -0.72  0.4744 
M α   1.4362 0.0850 16.89 <.0001  1.3563 0.1809 7.50 <.0001 1.7057 0.1426 11.96 <.0001 1.3560 0.1724 7.86 <.0001 1.2685 0.1445 8.78 <.0001 1.1705 0.1295 9.04  <.0001 
MM α   0.8657 0.1586 5.46 <.0001  1.5794 0.3179 4.97 <.0001 1.0013 0.1617 6.19 <.0001 0.8190 0.2649 3.09 0.0028 1.0603 0.3494 3.03 0.0033 0.8796 0.3029  2.90 0.0048 
ML α   -1.4274 0.6066 -2.35 0.0212 -0.1163 0.6797 -0.17 0.8646 0.8778 0.4781 1.84 0.0702 -0.6720 0.6501 -1.03 0.3046 -1.0334 0.8487 -1.22 0.2271 1.4452 0.7334 1.97  0.0524 
MK α   0.3321 0.2680 1.24 0.2189 -0.0332 0.3070 -0.11 0.9142 -0.2699 0.4186 -0.64 0.5210 -0.1000 0.4570 -0.22 0.8274 0.0504 0.4055 0.12 0.9014 -0.6447 0.7008 -0.92  0.3604 
ME α   -0.4673 0.1501 -3.11 0.0026 -1.8124 0.3335 -5.43 <.0001 -1.0317 0.0905 -11.39 <.0001 -1.0262 0.2507 -4.09 0.0001 -1.4519 0.5432 -2.67 0.0092 -0.7665 0.2541 -3.02  0.0035 
MT γ   -0.0022 0.0021 -1.07 0.2879 -0.0012 0.0048 -0.24 0.8101 -0.0038 0.0043 -0.89 0.3753 -0.0003 0.0049 -0.06 0.9499 0.0054 0.0044 1.24 0.2183 0.0029 0.0090 0.32  0.7464 
2 α   -0.3119 0.0903 -3.46 0.0009 -0.4136 0.1711 -2.42 0.0180 -0.6658 0.1741 -3.82 0.0003 -0.6444 0.2805 -2.30 0.0243 -0.2430 0.1692 -1.44 0.1550 0.0787 0.1784 0.44  0.6605 
3 α   -0.0579 0.1286 -0.45 0.6537 -0.4215 0.1921 -2.19 0.0312 -0.5875 0.1677 -3.50 0.0008 -0.5555 0.2580 -2.15 0.0344 -0.2561 0.1735 -1.48 0.1440 0.1271 0.1662 0.76  0.4467 
4 α   -0.3058 0.0866 -3.53 0.0007 -0.3069 0.1809 -1.70 0.0940 -0.6809 0.1623 -4.20 <.0001 -0.4083 0.2290 -1.78 0.0785 -0.1783 0.1766 -1.01 0.3158 0.0116 0.1558 0.07  0.9410 
5 α   -0.2887 0.0880 -3.28 0.0016 -0.2251 0.1984 -1.13 0.2600 -0.6657 0.1548 -4.30 <.0001 -0.3489 0.2253 -1.55 0.1255 -0.2353 0.1713 -1.37 0.1736 -0.1023 0.1521 -0.67  0.5035 
6 α   -0.5526 0.1278 -4.32 <.0001 -0.2145 0.2013 -1.07 0.2900 -0.6612 0.1726 -3.83 0.0003 -0.2852 0.2553 -1.12 0.2674 -0.2346 0.1863 -1.26 0.2117 -0.2218 0.1730 -1.28  0.2035 
7 α   -0.5606 0.1373 -4.08 0.0001 -0.2972 0.2082 -1.43 0.1575 -0.6405 0.1786 -3.59 0.0006 -0.2005 0.2561 -0.78 0.4360 -0.2236 0.1938 -1.15 0.2522 -0.4356 0.2064 -2.11  0.0381 
8 α   -0.5125 0.1282 -4.00 0.0001 -0.2548 0.2034 -1.25 0.2142 -0.6137 0.1690 -3.63 0.0005 -0.1951 0.2541 -0.77 0.4449 -0.2397 0.1882 -1.27 0.2066 -0.1162 0.2804 -0.41  0.6798 
9 α   -0.5175 0.1234 -4.19 <.0001 -0.3488 0.2054 -1.70 0.0936 -0.6687 0.1669 -4.01 0.0001 -0.2055 0.2541 -0.81 0.4213 -0.2440 0.1851 -1.32 0.1913 -0.2070 0.2065 -1.00  0.3192 
10 α   -0.4842 0.1140 -4.25 <.0001 -0.2389 0.2062 -1.16 0.2503 -0.6355 0.1579 -4.02 0.0001 -0.2491 0.2627 -0.95 0.3459 -0.2443 0.1801 -1.36 0.1790 -0.1461 0.1894 -0.77  0.4427 
11 α   -0.3758 0.0969 -3.88 0.0002 -0.2886 0.2135 -1.35 0.1805 -0.6224 0.1472 -4.23 <.0001 0.0263 0.3045 0.09 0.9315 -0.3515 0.2610 -1.35 0.1820 -0.1696 0.1694 -1.00  0.3199 
12 α   -0.2179 0.0765 -2.85 0.0056 -0.3773 0.3125 -1.21 0.2311 -0.4427 0.1359 -3.26 0.0017 0.1343 0.2371 0.57 0.5727 0.0060 0.1715 0.03 0.9724 0.1296 0.1502 0.86  0.3912 
Θ   0.0018 0.0029 0.62 0.5391  0.0046 0.0054 0.86 0.3927 -0.0009 0.0011 -0.83 0.4119 0.0060 0.0048 1.24 0.2192 0.0293 0.0183 1.61 0.1121 0.0227 0.0233 0.97  0.3337 
Equation 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
M ln   0.9788 0.9728 1.3279 0.8497 0.8093 1.4938 0.9588 0.9471 1.2231 0.9215 0.9017 1.2065 0.8811 0.8514 1.3608 0.9186 0.8980 1.3886 
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Table A 1. Estimated parameters and statistical inference of N3SLS estimation of market structure models (continued) 
Region 06 Zhytomyr  Region 07 Zakarpattia  Region 08 Zaporizhia  Region 09 Ivano-Frankivsk  Region 10 Kiev  Region 11 Kirovohrad  Parameter 
Estimate St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate  St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate  St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| 
0 β   -0.7261 0.0706 -10.28 <.0001  -0.8435 0.1314 -6.42 <.0001 -0.8311 0.1508 -5.51 <.0001 -0.8308 0.0745 -11.15 <.0001 -0.6088 0.0529 -11.51 <.0001 -0.8309 0.0847 -9.81  <.0001 
M β   0.4054 0.1086 3.73 0.0004 0.0916 0.1283 0.71 0.4776 0.0550 0.0334 1.65 0.1036 0.1774 0.0539 3.29 0.0015 0.6150 0.0833 7.38 <.0001 0.1824 0.0365  4.99 <.0001 
D β   -0.0569 0.1189 -0.48 0.6336  -0.0547 0.2338 -0.23 0.8156 -0.1065 0.2428 -0.44 0.6621 0.0671 0.0861 0.78 0.4380 -0.0425 0.0618 -0.69 0.494 - - -  - 
B β   0.3967 0.1336 2.97 0.0040 0.7750 0.1970 3.93 0.0002 0.9526 0.2738 3.48 0.0008 1.0748 0.0873 12.32 <.0001 0.2421 0.0800 3.02 0.003 0.5296 0.1032  5.13 <.0001 
F β   -0.7452 0.1907 -3.91 0.0002  -0.3409 0.3387 -1.01 0.3175 -0.9010 0.4165 -2.16 0.0337 -0.2395 0.3359 -0.71 0.4780 -0.8997 0.1476 -6.09 <.0001 -0.9989 0.2181 -4.58  <.0001 
C φ   -3.2135 1.1527 -2.79 0.0067  -5.2356 4.5419 -1.15 0.2527 0.7510 1.3582 0.55 0.5819 -4.3078 2.7227 -1.58 0.1179 0.1876 0.5885 0.32 0.751 -4.1132 0.8574 -4.80  <.0001 
T δ   -0.0107 0.0065 -1.66 0.1020  -0.0136 0.0064 -2.11 0.0386 0.0112 0.0146 0.77 0.4459 -0.0273 0.0025 -10.76 <.0001 0.0028 0.0038 0.75 0.458 -0.0311 0.0044 -7.04  <.0001 
MT δ   0.0111 0.0030 3.73 0.0004 0.0059 0.0083 0.71 0.4775 0.0164 0.0098 1.67 0.0986 0.0183 0.0047 3.89 0.0002 0.0190 0.0026 7.38 <.0001 0.0203 0.0037  5.44 <.0001 
DT δ   0.0013 0.0040 0.34 0.7338 0.0161 0.0093 1.74 0.0852 0.0034 0.0068 0.50 0.6211 0.0043 0.0029 1.47 0.1449 0.0034 0.0018 1.87 0.065 - - -  - 
BT δ   0.0090 0.0035 2.58 0.0118 0.0215 0.0057 3.80 0.0003 0.0214 0.0123 1.74 0.0868 -0.0016 0.0032 -0.49 0.6265 0.0033 0.0025 1.32 0.192 -0.0136 0.0042 -3.29  0.0015 
FT δ   0.0046 0.0080 0.57 0.5691  -0.0135 0.0074 -1.82 0.0729 -0.0177 0.0209 -0.85 0.4007 0.0140 0.0058 2.41 0.0183 -0.0011 0.0054 -0.21 0.832 -0.0049 0.0071 -0.70  0.4887 
CT ϕ   0.0260 0.0273 0.95 0.3449  -0.0927 0.1285 -0.72 0.4730 -0.0250 0.0505 -0.49 0.6222 0.1386 0.0619 2.24 0.0282 0.0321 0.0105 3.06 0.003 -0.0603 0.0157 -3.83  0.0003 
2 β   -0.5078 0.0903 -5.63 <.0001  -0.7728 0.1725 -4.48 <.0001 -0.5703 0.1814 -3.14 0.0024 -0.1061 0.0785 -1.35 0.1808 0.0551 0.0485 1.14 0.259 -0.3618 0.0719 -5.04  <.0001 
3 β   -0.2911 0.0888 -3.28 0.0016  -0.6309 0.1753 -3.60 0.0006 -0.5477 0.1788 -3.06 0.0030 -0.0922 0.0751 -1.23 0.2238 0.0262 0.0487 0.54 0.592 -0.2952 0.0716 -4.13  <.0001 
4 β   0.0419 0.0876 0.48 0.6340  -0.2140 0.1700 -1.26 0.2121 0.0752 0.1771 0.42 0.6723 0.2027 0.0739 2.74 0.0076 0.2553 0.0507 5.03 <.0001 -0.0207 0.0719 -0.29  0.7743 
5 β   0.3143 0.0873 3.60 0.0006 0.1958 0.1611 1.21 0.2282 0.3772 0.1759 2.14 0.0352 0.5525 0.0803 6.88 <.0001 0.3692 0.0527 7.00 <.0001 0.1978 0.0731  2.71 0.0084 
6 β   1.0629 0.0963 11.03 <.0001 1.1435 0.1633 7.00 <.0001 0.8875 0.1812 4.90 <.0001 1.1931 0.1002 11.91 <.0001 0.7409 0.0579 12.79 <.0001 0.8227 0.0788 10.44  <.0001 
7 β   1.3042 0.0989 13.18 <.0001 1.3728 0.1658 8.28 <.0001 1.0444 0.2012 5.19 <.0001 1.4136 0.1041 13.58 <.0001 0.9444 0.0638 14.80 <.0001 1.0576 0.0821 12.88  <.0001 
8 β   1.2495 0.0997 12.53 <.0001 1.3206 0.1777 7.43 <.0001 0.7147 0.1896 3.77 0.0003 1.2805 0.1091 11.73 <.0001 0.9074 0.0631 14.37 <.0001 1.0512 0.0806 13.04  <.0001 
9 β   1.1274 0.0976 11.55 <.0001 1.2865 0.1671 7.70 <.0001 0.6344 0.1935 3.28 0.0016 1.1645 0.1004 11.60 <.0001 0.7624 0.0626 12.18 <.0001 0.9069 0.0796 11.39  <.0001 
10 β   0.9376 0.0965 9.71 <.0001 1.0457 0.1641 6.37 <.0001 0.3973 0.1888 2.10 0.0387 0.8579 0.0867 9.90 <.0001 0.6129 0.0597 10.26 <.0001 0.7003 0.0767 9.13  <.0001 
11 β   0.6121 0.0919 6.66 <.0001 0.7372 0.1577 4.67 <.0001 0.0585 0.1733 0.34 0.7365 0.5919 0.0830 7.13 <.0001 0.4240 0.0546 7.77 <.0001 0.4289 0.0726  5.90 <.0001 
12 β   0.0969 0.0884 1.10 0.2769 0.2631 0.1607 1.64 0.1059 -0.0961 0.1734 -0.55 0.5812 0.1608 0.0737 2.18 0.0322 0.1338 0.0512 2.61 0.011 0.0781 0.0719 1.09  0.2811 
M α   1.2837 0.0838 15.32 <.0001 1.2303 0.1754 7.02 <.0001 1.3979 0.1646 8.49 <.0001 0.9357 0.0524 17.85 <.0001 1.2365 0.0560 22.06 <.0001 1.3217 0.1574 8.40  <.0001 
MM α   0.6480 0.1002 6.47 <.0001 0.7530 0.1227 6.14 <.0001 1.0046 0.1590 6.32 <.0001 0.7372 0.0978 7.54 <.0001 0.8896 0.2106 4.22 <.0001 0.8203 0.1657  4.95 <.0001 
ML α   -0.3046 0.4219 -0.72 0.4725 0.0412 0.1438 0.29 0.7753 -0.2772 0.5256 -0.53 0.5994 -0.4635 0.1557 -2.98 0.0039 0.2755 0.4382 0.63 0.531 2.5483 1.2936 1.97  0.0524 
MK α   -0.2966 0.2642 -1.12 0.2651  -0.6080 0.2587 -2.35 0.0213 0.1684 0.5667 0.30 0.7671 -0.0733 0.1513 -0.48 0.6296 -0.4767 0.2014 -2.37 0.020 -1.0787 0.4783 -2.26  0.0270 
ME α   -0.6518 0.0811 -8.04 <.0001  -0.7420 0.1405 -5.28 <.0001 -1.1867 0.1913 -6.20 <.0001 -0.7584 0.1062 -7.14 <.0001 -0.9226 0.1218 -7.58 <.0001 -1.0732 0.2045 -5.25  <.0001 
MT γ   -0.0060 0.0028 -2.10 0.0390  -0.0087 0.0040 -2.17 0.0330 0.0063 0.0059 1.06 0.2923 0.0049 0.0016 3.00 0.0036 -0.0014 0.0019 -0.72 0.474 0.0063 0.0085 0.74  0.4632 
2 α   -0.2920 0.1233 -2.37 0.0204 0.1143 0.3044 0.38 0.7083 -0.4024 0.2101 -1.92 0.0591 0.0839 0.0692 1.21 0.2289 -0.2525 0.0769 -3.28 0.002 0.0148 0.2300 0.06  0.9488 
3 α   -0.2825 0.1146 -2.47 0.0159 0.0168 0.2739 0.06 0.9514 -0.3499 0.2081 -1.68 0.0968 0.1541 0.0782 1.97 0.0524 -0.1813 0.0715 -2.53 0.013 0.0998 0.2682 0.37  0.7108 
4 α   -0.2078 0.1027 -2.02 0.0465 0.0588 0.2601 0.23 0.8217 -0.2082 0.2089 -1.00 0.3220 0.1389 0.0866 1.60 0.1128 -0.1873 0.0702 -2.67 0.009 0.2763 0.2501 1.10  0.2727 
5 α   -0.1049 0.0990 -1.06 0.2931 0.0219 0.2260 0.10 0.9229 -0.3388 0.1963 -1.73 0.0884 0.2658 0.0738 3.60 0.0006 -0.1132 0.0790 -1.43 0.156 0.1356 0.2274 0.60  0.5525 
6 α   -0.2948 0.1089 -2.71 0.0084  -0.2826 0.2188 -1.29 0.2004 -0.3152 0.2169 -1.45 0.1503 0.0563 0.0747 0.75 0.4535 -0.3017 0.1148 -2.63 0.010 -0.0165 0.2234 -0.07  0.9414 
7 α   -0.2889 0.1114 -2.59 0.0114  -0.2327 0.2162 -1.08 0.2850 -0.3812 0.2195 -1.74 0.0865 0.0322 0.0763 0.42 0.6738 -0.2838 0.1060 -2.68 0.009 -0.0391 0.2358 -0.17  0.8687 
8 α   -0.2138 0.1078 -1.98 0.0508  -0.1576 0.2144 -0.73 0.4646 -0.4115 0.2285 -1.80 0.0756 0.0341 0.0735 0.46 0.6442 -0.2348 0.1004 -2.34 0.022 -0.0802 0.2226 -0.36  0.7197 
9 α   -0.2217 0.1071 -2.07 0.0418  -0.1808 0.2371 -0.76 0.4482 -0.5721 0.2841 -2.01 0.0475 0.0528 0.0727 0.73 0.4698 -0.2801 0.0868 -3.23 0.002 -0.0895 0.2155 -0.42  0.6790 
10 α   -0.3158 0.1076 -2.94 0.0044 0.0454 0.2630 0.17 0.8633 -0.1232 0.2544 -0.48 0.6296 0.0242 0.0708 0.34 0.7329 -0.2461 0.0800 -3.08 0.003 -0.0983 0.2123 -0.46  0.6445 
11 α   -0.1764 0.1036 -1.70 0.0927  -0.0875 0.1989 -0.44 0.6614 -0.0956 0.1939 -0.49 0.6235 0.0213 0.0663 0.32 0.7487 -0.2014 0.0705 -2.86 0.006 0.0439 0.1985 0.22  0.8258 
12 α   -0.1724 0.1101 -1.57 0.1214 0.0271 0.1927 0.14 0.8887 -0.2274 0.1859 -1.22 0.2251 0.0630 0.0647 0.97 0.3331 -0.1786 0.0661 -2.70 0.008 0.1611 0.1861 0.87  0.3894 
Θ   0.0013 0.0023 0.60 0.5530  -0.0001 0.0045 -0.03 0.9765 0.0097 0.0085 1.14 0.2579 0.0005 0.0045 0.11 0.9118 -0.0063 0.0037 -1.69 0.096 0.0242 0.0160 1.51  0.1361 
Equation 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
M ln   0.9349 0.9174 1.6259 0.9000 0.8716 1.6559 0.8444 0.8025 1.0871 0.9406 0.9237 1.7656 0.9348 0.9163 1.7930 0.9370 0.9212 1.0785 










0.6085 0.5170 1.1030 
0.5149   21 
Table A 1. Estimated parameters and statistical inference of N3SLS estimation of market structure models (continued) 
Region 12 Luhansk  Region 13 Lviv  Region 14 Mykolaiv  Region 16 Poltava  Region 18 Sumy  Region 19 Ternopil 
Parameter 
Estimate  St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t|  Estimat
e 
St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t|  Estimat
e 
St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t|  Estimat
e 
St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t|  Estimat
e 
St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t|  Estimat
e 
St. 
Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t| 
0 β   -1.5078 0.1613 -9.35 <.0001  -0.9848 0.1093 -9.01 <.0001 -0.6151 0.0778 -7.90 <.0001 -1.0698 0.1263 -8.47 <.0001 -0.9870 0.0869 -11.36 <.0001 -1.1665 0.1066 -10.94  <.0001 
M β   0.0298 0.0141 2.11 0.0386 0.0080 0.0113 0.71 0.4813 0.0836 0.0581 1.44 0.1543 0.1867 0.0596 3.13 0.0025 0.4980 0.1082 4.60 <.0001 0.0255 0.0123  2.08 0.0409 
D β   - - - -  -0.2390  0.0977 -2.45 0.0167 -0.5189 0.1191 -4.36 <.0001 -0.2273 0.1285 -1.77 0.0811 - - - - - -  -  - 
B β   0.9685 0.1777 5.45 <.0001 0.5199 0.1138 4.57 <.0001 0.6935 0.1039 6.68 <.0001 0.8714 0.1150 7.58 <.0001 0.4701 0.1531 3.07 0.0030 0.3465 0.1091  3.18 0.0022 
F β   -1.8200 0.4616 -3.94 0.0002  -0.2888 0.1523 -1.90 0.0617 -0.6133 0.2952 -2.08 0.0412 -0.6624 0.2572 -2.58 0.0120 -0.4806 0.1925 -2.50 0.0147 -0.3720 0.1095 -3.40  0.0011 
C φ   -5.4456 2.0134 -2.70 0.0084 2.0611 1.8104 1.14 0.2586 -2.6455 1.0541 -2.51 0.0143 -4.0728 1.5543 -2.62 0.0107 -3.2093 1.1014 -2.91 0.0047 -6.5628 1.0201 -6.43  <.0001 
T δ   -0.0166 0.0092 -1.81 0.0745 0.0030 0.0028 1.06 0.2912 0.0007 0.0031 0.22 0.8237 -0.0208 0.0068 -3.06 0.0031 -0.0228 0.0057 -4.03 0.0001 -0.0327 0.0050 -6.57  <.0001 
MT δ   0.0185 0.0068 2.71 0.0084 0.0055 0.0077 0.72 0.4733 -0.0080 0.0055 -1.44 0.1535 0.0150 0.0048 3.14 0.0024 0.0130 0.0028 4.60 <.0001 0.0167 0.0076 2.21  0.0303 
DT δ   - - - -  0.0060  0.0032 1.90 0.0616 0.0105 0.0042 2.53 0.0137 0.0088  0.0048 1.82 0.0725 - - - - 0.0014 0.0055 0.26  0.7989 
BT δ   0.0219 0.0084 2.61 0.0110 0.0003 0.0057 0.05 0.9620 -0.0057 0.0042 -1.36 0.1775 0.0039 0.0080 0.49 0.6274 0.0040 0.0078 0.51 0.6085 0.0159 0.0041 3.90  0.0002 
FT δ   -0.0194 0.0155 -1.25 0.2159 0.0000 0.0069 0.00 0.9989 -0.0135 0.0088 -1.53 0.1313 -0.0065 0.0089 -0.73 0.4662 0.0045 0.0069 0.66 0.5113 0.0161 0.0078 2.06  0.0429 
CT ϕ   -0.0676 0.0438 -1.54 0.1270  -0.0276 0.0538 -0.51 0.6095 -0.0901 0.0332 -2.72 0.0082 -0.0270 0.0275 -0.98 0.3304 -0.0001 0.0222 0.00 0.9982 0.0461 0.0368 1.25  0.2150 
2 β   -0.2504 0.1454 -1.72 0.0891  -0.0612 0.1227 -0.50 0.6196 -0.3746 0.0784 -4.78 <.0001 0.0173 0.0825 0.21 0.8347 0.0209 0.0797 0.26 0.7942 -0.3170 0.1128 -2.81  0.0063 
3 β   -0.1248 0.1450 -0.86 0.3920  -0.0941 0.1227 -0.77 0.4454 -0.2304 0.0778 -2.96 0.0041 0.0227 0.0828 0.27 0.7850 -0.0107 0.0785 -0.14 0.8920 -0.2227 0.1125 -1.98  0.0513 
4 β   0.3979 0.1474 2.70 0.0086 0.4099 0.1226 3.34 0.0013 0.1527 0.0780 1.96 0.0542 0.5077 0.0864 5.87 <.0001 0.3293 0.0809 4.07 0.0001 0.2881 0.1158  2.49 0.0151 
5 β   0.7918 0.1523 5.20 <.0001 0.8129 0.1229 6.61 <.0001 0.5764 0.0781 7.38 <.0001 0.5970 0.0867 6.88 <.0001 0.5476 0.0877 6.24 <.0001 0.6536 0.1201  5.44 <.0001 
6 β   1.5255 0.1576 9.68 <.0001 1.5391 0.1290 11.93 <.0001 0.9083 0.0884 10.28 <.0001 1.0969 0.0987 11.12 <.0001 1.1739 0.0945 12.42 <.0001 1.1880 0.1207 9.84  <.0001 
7 β   1.6917 0.1625 10.41 <.0001 1.7456 0.1383 12.62 <.0001 1.0317 0.0941 10.96 <.0001 1.3005 0.1049 12.39 <.0001 1.5306 0.1059 14.46 <.0001 1.5041 0.1240 12.13  <.0001 
8 β   1.6737 0.1694 9.88 <.0001 1.5265 0.1405 10.87 <.0001 1.0178 0.0993 10.25 <.0001 1.2163 0.1000 12.16 <.0001 1.4421 0.1052 13.71 <.0001 1.4434 0.1284 11.24  <.0001 
9 β   1.4810 0.1638 9.04 <.0001 1.4467 0.1360 10.64 <.0001 0.8778 0.0961 9.14 <.0001 1.1584 0.1000 11.58 <.0001 1.3241 0.1005 13.18 <.0001 1.3099 0.1262 10.38  <.0001 
10 β   1.2598 0.1509 8.35 <.0001 1.2709 0.1276 9.96 <.0001 0.6894 0.0931 7.41 <.0001 0.9665 0.0939 10.30 <.0001 1.0765 0.0939 11.47 <.0001 1.1158 0.1221 9.14  <.0001 
11 β   0.8641 0.1469 5.88 <.0001 1.0106 0.1210 8.35 <.0001 0.5521 0.0824 6.70 <.0001 0.7385 0.0841 8.78 <.0001 0.8804 0.0908 9.69 <.0001 0.7471 0.1221  6.12 <.0001 
12 β   0.1139 0.1441 0.79 0.4317 0.3446 0.1219 2.83 0.0060 0.1935 0.0802 2.41 0.0182 0.3235 0.0784 4.13 <.0001 0.3476 0.0784 4.44 <.0001 0.2780 0.1147  2.42 0.0177 
M α   1.2944 0.1270 10.19 <.0001 1.0248 0.1198 8.56 <.0001 1.2330 0.1005 12.26 <.0001 1.2232 0.0765 15.99 <.0001 1.2894 0.0814 15.83 <.0001 1.3869 0.1106 12.54  <.0001 
MM α   1.0929 0.1916 5.70 <.0001 0.7283 0.1844 3.95 0.0002 0.4168 0.1565 2.66 0.0094 0.6899 0.1296 5.32 <.0001 0.6336 0.1188 5.33 <.0001 1.3315 0.1510  8.82 <.0001 
ML α   -0.5289 0.4901 -1.08 0.2838  -0.1662 0.2991 -0.56 0.5801 -0.4526 0.7046 -0.64 0.5225 -1.6603 0.5202 -3.19 0.0020 -3.4234 1.0105 -3.39 0.0011 -0.2012 0.8859 -0.23  0.8210 
MK α   -0.4903 0.3537 -1.39 0.1697  -0.2560 0.1825 -1.40 0.1648 0.0446 0.2698 0.17 0.8690 0.0015 0.1990 0.01 0.9941 0.4961 0.3649 1.36 0.1779 -0.3959 0.2917 -1.36  0.1786 
ME α   -1.0275 0.1493 -6.88 <.0001  -0.9531 0.1637 -5.82 <.0001 -0.4820 0.1332 -3.62 0.0005 -0.6628 0.1304 -5.08 <.0001 -0.5096 0.1558 -3.27 0.0016 -1.4011 0.1647 -8.51  <.0001 
MT γ   -0.0020 0.0050 -0.39 0.6949 0.0026 0.0024 1.06 0.2946 0.0057 0.0033 1.75 0.0836 -0.0013 0.0028 -0.48 0.6360 -0.0037 0.0026 -1.44 0.1528 0.0008 0.0028 0.27  0.7845 
2 α   -0.0113 0.1485 -0.08 0.9398  -0.1688 0.1114 -1.52 0.1338 -0.4961 0.1349 -3.68 0.0004 -0.3793 0.0964 -3.94 0.0002 -0.2674 0.0908 -2.94 0.0043 -0.2551 0.1225 -2.08  0.0406 
3 α   0.0761 0.1383 0.55 0.5839  -0.1463 0.1168 -1.25 0.2140 -0.3668 0.1086 -3.38 0.0011 -0.2163 0.0943 -2.29 0.0245 -0.2141 0.0921 -2.32 0.0227 -0.1991 0.1223 -1.63  0.1075 
4 α   -0.1223 0.1325 -0.92 0.3591  -0.0088 0.1225 -0.07 0.9428 -0.2033 0.1051 -1.93 0.0568 -0.1346 0.0907 -1.48 0.1421 -0.2834 0.0935 -3.03 0.0033 -0.1906 0.1281 -1.49  0.1406 
5 α   -0.1474 0.1441 -1.02 0.3096 0.1372 0.1390 0.99 0.3269 -0.1105 0.1156 -0.96 0.3423 -0.1742 0.0916 -1.90 0.0610 -0.2467 0.0942 -2.62 0.0106 -0.2290 0.1232 -1.86  0.0668 
6 α   -0.3532 0.1928 -1.83 0.0708 0.0281 0.1640 0.17 0.8645 -0.2245 0.1550 -1.45 0.1516 -0.1968 0.1048 -1.88 0.0642 -0.3907 0.1290 -3.03 0.0033 -0.2970 0.1546 -1.92  0.0585 
7 α   -0.4005 0.2131 -1.88 0.0640 0.0551 0.1663 0.33 0.7411 -0.1576 0.1580 -1.00 0.3215 -0.2101 0.1153 -1.82 0.0724 -0.4045 0.1384 -2.92 0.0046 -0.3406 0.1542 -2.21  0.0301 
8 α   -0.3715 0.2088 -1.78 0.0792 0.0310 0.1583 0.20 0.8454 -0.1238 0.1505 -0.82 0.4131 -0.2142 0.1129 -1.90 0.0615 -0.3240 0.1244 -2.60 0.0110 -0.3674 0.1509 -2.44  0.0172 
9 α   -0.3670 0.2143 -1.71 0.0909 0.0332 0.1596 0.21 0.8360 -0.1700 0.1470 -1.16 0.2512 -0.2032 0.1093 -1.86 0.0668 -0.2573 0.1229 -2.09 0.0396 -0.4133 0.1503 -2.75  0.0074 
10 α   -0.4207 0.2133 -1.97 0.0521 0.0916 0.1572 0.58 0.5617 -0.1747 0.1414 -1.24 0.2204 -0.2170 0.1043 -2.08 0.0408 -0.2702 0.1194 -2.26 0.0265 -0.3867 0.1507 -2.57  0.0122 
11 α   -0.4070 0.2705 -1.50 0.1365 0.0254 0.1550 0.16 0.8701 -0.1727 0.1364 -1.27 0.2095 -0.1066 0.0956 -1.11 0.2686 -0.1674 0.1208 -1.39 0.1696 -0.4826 0.1649 -2.93  0.0045 
12 α   0.2205 0.1413 1.56 0.1228  -0.0282 0.1726 -0.16 0.8704 -0.1979 0.1095 -1.81 0.0746 -0.1229 0.0877 -1.40 0.1652 -0.1899 0.1245 -1.52 0.1315 -0.1017 0.1587 -0.64  0.5236 
Θ   0.0090 0.0070 1.28 0.2047  -0.0003 0.0015 -0.18 0.8571 0.0000 0.0015 0.00 0.9999 -0.0007 0.0019 -0.36 0.7206 -0.0043 0.0059 -0.74 0.4643 0.0050 0.0038 1.33  0.1864 
Equation 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj. 
Value 
M ln   0.9054 0.8817 0.7537 0.9227 0.9019 0.9177 0.9624 0.9518 1.2803 0.9410 0.9243 1.7915 0.9414 0.9267 1.5809 0.8830 0.8535 1.1492 










0.8936 0.8690 1.7794 
0.4573   22 
Table A 1. Estimated parameters and statistical inference of N3SLS estimation of market structure models (continued) 
Region 21 Kherson  Region 22 Khmelnytskyi  Region 23 Cherkasy  Region 24 Chernivtsi  Region 25 Chernihiv 
Parameter 
Estimate St.  Error  t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate  St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate  St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate  St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| Estimate  St.  Error t-Ratio Pr  >|t| 
0 β   -0.6432 0.1000 -6.43 <.0001  -0.7602 0.0745 -10.20 <.0001 -0.4977 0.0907 -5.49 <.0001 -0.5138 0.0655 -7.84 <.0001 -1.0771 0.0880 -12.24 <.0001 
M β   0.4295 0.1932 2.22 0.0292 0.0732 0.0942 0.78 0.4394 0.4386 0.1259 3.48 0.0008 0.0089 0.0053 1.69 0.0954 0.0351 0.0105 3.33 0.0013 
D β   - - - - - - - - - - - -  -0.1479 0.1016 -1.46 0.1495 -0.1947 0.0959 -2.03 0.0460 
B β   0.9397 0.2624 3.58 0.0006 0.8091 0.1576 5.13 <.0001 0.5534 0.1559 3.55 0.0007 0.7699 0.0811 9.50 <.0001 0.9160 0.1284 7.14 <.0001 
F β   -0.4481 0.3892 -1.15 0.2533  -0.8823 0.1249 -7.07 <.0001 -0.9920 0.1342 -7.39 <.0001 -0.6308 0.1162 -5.43 <.0001 -1.3281 0.3420 -3.88 0.0002 
C φ   1.2010 1.1405 1.05 0.2956  -5.1340 0.8329 -6.16 <.0001 1.7007 1.0366 1.64  0.1050 -2.1293 0.8653 -2.46 0.0162 -7.3553 1.8119 -4.06 0.0001 
T δ   -0.0027 0.0038 -0.72 0.4754  -0.0207 0.0040 -5.16 <.0001 0.0111 0.0066 1.68 0.0969 -0.0146 0.0020 -7.27 <.0001 -0.0352 0.0084 -4.21 <.0001 
MT δ   0.0106 0.0048 2.23 0.0290 0.0034 0.0044 0.78 0.4398 0.0161 0.0046 3.49 0.0008 0.0183 0.0046 3.95 0.0002 0.0162 0.0048 3.42 0.0010 
DT δ   - - - - - - - - - - - -  -0.0056 0.0042 -1.34 0.1829 0.0147 0.0044 3.34 0.0013 
BT δ   -0.0009 0.0106 -0.08 0.9337 0.0122 0.0045 2.68 0.0089 -0.0014 0.0041 -0.34 0.7368 0.0073 0.0036 2.01 0.0478 0.0023 0.0065 0.36 0.7180 
FT δ   -0.0211 0.0111 -1.89 0.0620  -0.0057 0.0078 -0.72 0.4722 0.0075 0.0081 0.93 0.3527 -0.0203 0.0051 -3.99 0.0002 -0.0099 0.0086 -1.15 0.2539 
CT ϕ   -0.0959 0.0334 -2.87 0.0053  -0.0522 0.0412 -1.26 0.2097 0.0332 0.0275 1.21 0.2316 -0.0981 0.0320 -3.07 0.0030 -0.0052 0.0261 -0.20 0.8430 
2 β   -0.7139 0.1107 -6.45 <.0001  -0.2816 0.0815 -3.45 0.0009 -0.0273 0.0895 -0.30 0.7615 -0.1903 0.0725 -2.62 0.0105 -0.1165 0.0791 -1.47 0.1448 
3 β   -0.7241 0.1107 -6.54 <.0001  -0.3206 0.0814 -3.94 0.0002 -0.0977 0.0890 -1.10 0.2757 -0.2830 0.0727 -3.89 0.0002 -0.2082 0.0773 -2.69 0.0088 
4 β   -0.3076 0.1142 -2.69 0.0087 0.1333 0.0818 1.63 0.1072 0.1350 0.0914 1.48 0.1437 -0.0055 0.0723 -0.08 0.9396 0.4461 0.0835 5.34 <.0001 
5 β   -0.0170 0.1205 -0.14 0.8882 0.3654 0.0850 4.30 <.0001 0.1883 0.0966 1.95 0.0549 0.0687 0.0766 0.90 0.3723 0.7019 0.0917 7.65 <.0001 
6 β   0.5706 0.1347 4.24 <.0001 0.9400 0.0925 10.17 <.0001 0.5951 0.1040 5.72 <.0001 0.5234 0.0752 6.96 <.0001 1.4397 0.1003 14.35 <.0001 
7 β   0.7004 0.1375 5.09 <.0001 1.1022 0.0940 11.73 <.0001 0.8427 0.1113 7.57 <.0001 0.8507 0.0760 11.19 <.0001 1.6746 0.1052 15.92 <.0001 
8 β   0.8488 0.1402 6.06 <.0001 1.0068 0.0940 10.71 <.0001 0.8499 0.1134 7.50 <.0001 0.7663 0.0827 9.27 <.0001 1.5941 0.1020 15.63 <.0001 
9 β   0.6760 0.1309 5.16 <.0001 0.8733 0.0943 9.26 <.0001 0.7142 0.1100 6.49 <.0001 0.6630 0.0778 8.53 <.0001 1.4586 0.0961 15.18 <.0001 
10 β   0.5196 0.1266 4.11 0.0001 0.6346 0.0885 7.17 <.0001 0.5012 0.0994 5.04 <.0001 0.4703 0.0758 6.20 <.0001 1.2537 0.0894 14.03 <.0001 
11 β   0.3799 0.1250 3.04 0.0032 0.4757 0.0899 5.29 <.0001 0.4990 0.0987 5.06 <.0001 0.2447 0.0710 3.45 0.0009 0.7534 0.0789 9.55 <.0001 
12 β   -0.0999 0.1126 -0.89 0.3777 0.0160 0.0811 0.20 0.8441 0.1969 0.0926 2.13 0.0367 -0.0550 0.0707 -0.78 0.4396 0.2997 0.0785 3.82 0.0003 
M α   1.4124 0.1534 9.21 <.0001 1.3646 0.0823 16.59 <.0001 1.2366 0.1081 11.44 <.0001 1.4597 0.1664 8.77 <.0001 1.5759 0.1869 8.43 <.0001 
MM α   1.0052 0.1303 7.71 <.0001 1.1560 0.1153 10.03 <.0001 0.8553 0.5779 1.48 0.1430 1.1887 0.1551 7.66 <.0001 0.8252 0.4081 2.02 0.0467 
ML α   0.5153 1.4870 0.35 0.7299  -0.1397 0.3794 -0.37 0.7137 -2.0190 1.5140 -1.33 0.1863 0.1361 0.6382 0.21 0.8317 -2.0409 0.9456 -2.16 0.0340 
MK α   0.0859 0.6037 0.14 0.8872  -0.7772 0.1889 -4.11 <.0001 0.2332 0.4592 0.51  0.6129 -0.3412 0.3204 -1.06 0.2903 -0.1976 0.4249 -0.47 0.6432 
ME α   -0.6679 0.3355 -1.99 0.0500  -0.9385 0.0949 -9.89 <.0001 -0.9296 0.5083 -1.83 0.0713 -1.3062 0.1648 -7.93 <.0001 -0.6010 0.3941 -1.53 0.1313 
MT γ   0.0104 0.0055 1.88 0.0633  -0.0044 0.0027 -1.62 0.1084 0.0029 0.0032 0.92 0.3594 0.0019 0.0045 0.41 0.6833 -0.0065 0.0054 -1.20 0.2349 
2 α   0.1999 0.2236 0.89 0.3741  -0.1391 0.1082 -1.29 0.2024 -0.3028 0.1651 -1.83 0.0706 -0.2252 0.1806 -1.25 0.2160 -0.3993 0.2416 -1.65 0.1025 
3 α   0.1587 0.2234 0.71 0.4796  -0.1551 0.1283 -1.21 0.2303 -0.2871 0.1508 -1.90 0.0606 -0.1710 0.1949 -0.88 0.3830 -0.4426 0.2829 -1.56 0.1219 
4 α   -0.1336 0.1927 -0.69 0.4901  -0.1222 0.1254 -0.97 0.3332 -0.1612 0.1467 -1.10 0.2752 -0.2005 0.1905 -1.05 0.2958 -0.3123 0.2106 -1.48 0.1422 
5 α   -0.2237 0.1922 -1.16 0.2482  -0.2251 0.1106 -2.04 0.0452 -0.2127 0.1415 -1.50 0.1368 -0.2199 0.1940 -1.13 0.2607 -0.3468 0.2095 -1.66 0.1019 
6 α   -0.5232 0.2500 -2.09 0.0397  -0.4113 0.1269 -3.24 0.0018 -0.2211 0.1630 -1.36 0.1790 -0.3038 0.1924 -1.58 0.1185 -0.6532 0.2843 -2.30 0.0243 
7 α   -0.4635 0.2409 -1.92 0.0581  -0.3991 0.1263 -3.16 0.0023 -0.2085 0.1863 -1.12 0.2666 -0.2853 0.1915 -1.49 0.1402 -0.7655 0.3251 -2.35 0.0211 
8 α   -0.3492 0.2148 -1.63 0.1081  -0.3795 0.1208 -3.14 0.0024 -0.1610 0.1894 -0.85 0.3979 -0.3653 0.1889 -1.93 0.0567 -0.6937 0.3015 -2.30 0.0241 
9 α   -0.3743 0.2302 -1.63 0.1080  -0.4451 0.1225 -3.63 0.0005 -0.2169 0.1674 -1.30 0.1989 -0.3706 0.1913 -1.94 0.0564 -0.7394 0.3128 -2.36 0.0206 
10 α   -0.6879 0.3276 -2.10 0.0390  -0.4083 0.1231 -3.32 0.0014 -0.4738 0.4086 -1.16 0.2498 -0.4303 0.1978 -2.18 0.0327 -0.9298 0.3519 -2.64 0.0100 
11 α   -0.4636 0.2251 -2.06 0.0428  -0.3045 0.1073 -2.84 0.0058 -0.1350 0.1771 -0.76 0.4482 -0.3129 0.1979 -1.58 0.1180 -0.1374 0.2659 -0.52 0.6067 
12 α   -0.1857 0.1879 -0.99 0.3260  -0.0279 0.0987 -0.28 0.7779 -0.1326 0.1515 -0.87 0.3843 -0.2619 0.2151 -1.22 0.2272 -0.2699 0.2006 -1.35 0.1824 
Θ   -0.0071 0.0088 -0.81 0.4214 0.0007 0.0013 0.51 0.6115 0.0033 0.0089 0.36 0.7162 0.0078 0.0045 1.75 0.0841 0.0102 0.0058 1.76 0.0822 
Equation 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj.  
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj.  
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj.  
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj.  
Value 
2 R   2 R  DW 
Obj.  
Value 
M ln   0.9074 0.8843 1.1489 0.9197 0.9007 0.9778 0.8490 0.8133 0.8490 0.9257 0.9057 1.2958 0.9619 0.9510 1.6246 








0.3181 0.1586 1.9944 
0.3692 
 